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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
It is submitted that the problem raised in the instant case is
more satisfactorily answered, in accordance with advanced social
concepts, by the "Briggs Law" 22 in Massachusetts. By statute, a
routine mental examination is made of all persons indicted by a
grand jury for a capital offense, and persons who have been con-
victed of a felony or are known to have been previously indicted for
any other offense more than once.
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CRIMINAL LAW-MATERIAL WITNESS-AMOUNT OF BAIL-
HOLDING AS A WITNESS A PERSON CHARGED WITH A CRIME.--
Application for writ of habeas corpus. Relator was a material wit-
ness for the People in a grand jury investigation of gambling and
corruption in Kings County. The County Court directed him to
furnish a 250,000 dollar bond and upon his failure to do so he was
committed to jail. Thereafter, on the basis of the above-mentioned
grand jury investigation an information was filed charging relator
with conspiracy and bookmaking. A plea of not guilty was entered
and relator was paroled in his own custody in view of his detention
in the grand jury investigation. Relator contends that inasmuch
as he is now a defendant named in the information, the order detain-
ing him as a witness should be vacated and he should be released.
Held, writ dismissed. An order requiring bail in a high amount may
be justified by the facts of the particular situation. The fact that
an information has been filed in which a person is charged with crimes
does not preclude his being held as a witness in an investigation
embracing matters other than the crimes charged in the information.
People ex rel. Gross v. Sheriff of City of New York, 277 App. Div.
546, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 271 (2d Dep't 1950).
Section 618-b of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
a witness for the People may be ordered to enter into an undertaking
to insure appearance or be committed for failure to comply.1 This
section of the Code was enacted to guarantee attendance of key wit-
nesses at a criminal trial or a grand jury investigation. 2  The req-
22 See WEHoFEN, INSANITY AS A DFFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 351, 401-
407 (1933).
23 MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 123, § 100A (1949).
I Section 618-b provides: "Whenever a judge of a court of record in
this state is satisfied, by proof on oath, that a person residing or being in this
state is a necessary and material witness for the People in a criminal action
or proceeding... he may, after an opportunity has been given to such person
to ... be heard in opposition thereto, order such person to enter into a written
undertaking ... and upon his neglect or refusal to comply .. .the judge
must commit him...
2 People ex rel. Ditchik v. Sheriff of Kings County, 171 Misc. 248, 12
N. Y. S. 2d 341 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 1081, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 232
(2d Dep't 1939).
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uisite fact which must be present is that a criminal action or pro-
ceeding is pending in some New York court." A grand jury in-
vestigation is a proceeding within the purview of this section. 4 While
there is little reason to doubt its constitutionality, Section 618-b
has been characterized as "harsh" because it interferes with personal
liberty.6 Therefore, the People must comply strictly to the require-
ments of the section.
7
Any judge of a court of record may detain a witness for the
People under Section 618-b.8  He must be satisfied by proof on
oath that the individual is a material witness in a criminal action.9
The proof required is not the kind which a conviction requires but
merely such as satisfies the court.10 Upon hearing the prosecutor
and the witness 1" the judge may set bail in such amount as he
deems proper ' 2 or commit the witness for failure to comply. An
order requiring bail in a high amount may be justified by the serious-
ness of the crimes under investigation, the extensive criminal opera-
tions of the witness, his relations with those against whom he may
testify, and the possibility of his flight to avoid giving testimony. 13
An order fixing bail is not a "final" order and is not appeal-
able. 14  However, where there is an invasion of one's constitutional
sMatter of Prestigiacomo, 234 App. Div. 300, 255 N. Y. Supp. 289 (4th
Dep't 1932); Matter of Di Piazzi, 234 App. Div. 302, 255 N. Y. Supp. 291
(4th Dep't 1932).
People ex rql. Nuccio v. Warden of Eighth Dist. Prison of City of N. Y.,
182 Misc. 654, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 230 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
G People ex rel. Ditchik v. Sheriff of Kings County, 171 Misc. 248, 12
N. Y. S. 2d 341 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 1081, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 232
(2d Dep't 1939); People ex rel. Bruno v. Maudlin, 123 Misc. 906, 206 N. Y.
Supp. 523 (Sup. Ct. 1924). Contra: People ex rel. Maloney v. Sheriff of
Kings County, 117 Misc. 421, 192 N. Y. Supp. 553 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (held
Section 618-b unconstitutional).
a Matter of Prestigiacomo, 234 App. Div. 300, 255 N. Y. Supp. 289 (4th
Dep't 1932).
7 Ibid.
8 See note 1 supra.
9 See note 1 supra; People ex rel. Ditchik v. Sheriff of Kings County,
171 Misc. 248, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 341 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 1081, 12
N. Y. S. 2d 232 (2d Dep't 1939).
0 People ex reL. Ditchik v. Sheriff of Kings County, supra note 9.
21 Under Section 618-b the witness must receive a hearing. See note 1
supra.
12 "The bailing court has a large discretion, but it is a judicial, not a pure
or unfettered discretion." People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 296 N. Y.
109, 111, 71 N. E. 2d 423, 425 (1947). The relator, a defendant in a larceny
case, was held in 250,000-dollar bail although prosecution asked for 100,000
dollars. Relator had voluntarily surrendered to the police and there was noth-
ing to indicate that he had any intentions of absconding. The Court of Appeals
reversed an order of the Appellate Division denying a writ of habeas corpus.
23 People ex rel. Rao v. Adams, 296 N. Y. 231, 72 N. E. 2d 170 (1947).4 People v. John Doe (Re Bernoff), 261 App. Div. 504, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 458
(1st Dept 1941) ; People v. John Doe (Re Rubenstein), 259 App. Div. 921,
20 N. Y. S. 2d 263 (2d Dep't 1940); People v. John Doe (Re Workman),
259 App. Div. 1027, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 608 (2d Dep't 1940) ; People ex rel. Deliz
v. Warden of City Prison, 260 App. Div. 155, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 435 (1st Dep't
19511]
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right by being unreasonably detained as a witness or by being held
in excessive bail,15 a means of relief may be granted by a writ of
habeas corpus.16 Relief is granted to prevent only such invasion
and not because of any difference of opinion as to the amount of
bail fixed.1 7  In the case at bar the court found no violation of the
relator's constitutional rights and held that setting the bail at 250,000
dollars was justified in light of the facts; namely, relator had no
visible means of support apart from his confessed criminal activities,
he admittedly had bribed police officers, and there was reason to
suspect relator would not appear when required.
In the instant case the question also arose as to whether or not
relator could be legally detained as a material witness in a grand
jury investigation in view of the fact that he was thereafter named
as a defendant in an information resulting from such investigation.
The majority held that the relator could be so held where the in-
vestigation related to crimes other than those charged in the infor-
mation. The dissent felt that there was no substantial difference
between the two proceedings and relator was, therefore, being held
both as witness and defendant in the same action. There is no doubt
that a person cannot be held as a witness for the People in an action
in which he is a defendant. As a witness he necessarily would have
to give self.-incriminating testimony and could not be compelled to
do so without being guaranteed immunization.' 8 But if the witness,
in such case, is guaranteed immunity the People would lose its de-
fendant. The process, therefore, would be self-defeating.
There seems to be no direct authority for the proposition laid
down in the present case, that is, that one may be held as a witness
and a defendant in different actions. But as the majority said:
"There is no statute which prohibits, and as far as I am aware, no
judicial fiat which indicates that a person may not at the same time
be held as a defendant in a criminal prosecution and as a necessary
and material witness in another criminal action or proceeding." The
dissent was in accord with this and merely disagreed on the facts
as to the existence of another criminal action or proceeding.' 9 There
1940) (relator defendant). But cf. Matter of Prestigiacomo, 234 App. Div.
300, 255 N. Y. Supp. 289 (4th Dep't 1932); Matter of Di Piazzi, 234 App.
Div. 302, 255 N. Y. Supp. 291 (4th Dep't 1932).
15N. Y. CoNsr. Art. I, § 5. "Excessive bail shall not be required .. .nor
shall witnesses be unreasonably detained."Is See note 13 supra.
"1 People ax rel. Rao v. Adams, 296 N. Y. 231, 72 N. E. 2d 170 (1947);
People ex rel. Deliz v. Warden of City Prison, 260 App. Div. 155, 21 N. Y. S.
2d 435 (1st Dep't 1940); People ax rel. Weiner v. Collins, 22 N. Y. S. 2d
774, aff'd, 260 App. Div. 806, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 775 (2d Dep't 1940).
1s U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V. ". . . nor shall [any person] be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . ."; N. Y. PENAL LAW§ 996. Matter of Doyle, 257 N. Y. 244, 177 N. E. 489 (1931).
19 Carswell, J., in his dissenting opinion in which Wenzel, J., concurred,
said: "A different situation would exist if the prosecution in which the relator
is named as a defendant related to a field other than that covered by the Grand
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is no reason to believe that the law in New York is not as expressed
by the holding in the principal case. It would seem that any other
conclusion would hamper the administration of justice.
X
CRIMINAL LAw-SUNDAY LAWS-CARRYING ON OF A PUBLIC
TRAFFIc.-Two Jewish merchants offered for sale and sold uncooked
meats on a Sunday. They were convicted for a violation of Section
2147 of the New York Penal Law, which forbids all manner of
public selling or offering for sale of any property on a Sunday. On
appeal the Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the con-
viction. The Court of Appeals sustained the Appellate Division,
holding that the exemption of Section 2144 allowing work or labor
to be performed by those who uniformly keep a day other than the
first day of the week as a holy time and do not work on that day
cannot be interposed as a defense to a prosecution for the carrying
on of a public traffic on Sunday, and that Section 2147 is not uncon-
stitutional because it imposes a hardship on merchants who keep a
day other than Sunday as a day of rest and holy time. People v.
Friedman, People v. Praska, 302 N. Y. 75, 96 N. E. 2d 184 (1950).
The basis of the present Sunday laws is found in the Act of
October 22, 1695.1 As the present law, although it required no
affirmative religious act, it specifically enumerated the acts forbidden:
". .. travelling servile Labouring and working shooting fishing
sporting playing horse Racing hunting or frequenting Tipling
houses . . . ." With the exception of travelling and frequenting
tippling houses, the activities restricted by the Act of 1695 are still
prohibited by the present law, while the acts which have since been
constituted offenses are all occupations which have been developed
since 1695. Exemptions under the Act of 1695 were very limited;
primarily free Indians, works of necessity and travelling to church.
This act gradually evolved into our present system of Sunday
regulation and now constitutes Article 192 of the Penal Law.
Jury investigation. In such an event the relator might be held both as a de-
fendant and as a witness." People ex rel. Gross v. Sheriff of City of N. Y.,
277 App. Div. 546, 552, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 271, 276 (2d Dep't 1950).
1 1 Colonial Laws of New York 356 (1894). The earliest law of New
York providing for the observance of religion is contained in the Conditions
of Burgomasters of Amsterdam of 1656. It required that the city send a
schoolmaster to a place established by the colonists where he would read the
Holy Scriptures and set the Psalms. See People v. Hoym, 20 How. Pr. 76(N. Y. 1860). Subsequently, under English rule, by the Duke of York's Laws
of 1665 public preaching on Sunday was established and Sabbath breaking wasprohibited. 1 Colonial Laws of New York 25 (1894). The same laws ex-
press the colonist's religious feeling and toleration by providing that, "If any
person within this Government shall by direct, exprest, impious or presump-
tous ways, deny the true God and his Attributes, he shall be put to death."
1 Colonial Laws of New York 20 (1894).
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